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ABSTRACT 
Suppliers of microfinance are typically Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
cooperatives or specialized microfinance institutions incorporated as Shareholder Firms 
(SHFs). Leaving out the cooperatives we study whether NGOs and SHFs differ in bringing 
along social benefit to their clients. Specifically, is there a trade-off between different 
dimensions of social benefits, and can these tradeoffs predict ownership type? To frame the 
comparison of NGOs and SHFs we make use of Schreiner’s (2002) framework for discussion 
of the social benefits of microfinance. A self constructed dataset with unusually high-quality 
rating information from 132 NGOs and 68 SHFs in 53 countries is used to carry out the 
statistical tests. Our findings indicate that SHFs and NGOs are more similar than different. 
Our hypothesis that NGOs are more socially oriented than SHFs is rejected. SHFs’ benefit in 
scale and scope seems not related to ownership, but to legal constraints impeding NGOs to 
mobilize savings. Our second conclusion is that we cannot find a trade-off among outreach 
variables. Specifically, the return on assets is higher in NGOs. We conclude that ownership 
doesn’t influence the performance of microfinance organizations. Our conclusion is in line 
with findings in the general banking industry. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance is the supply of banking services to micro-enterprises and poor families. Access 
to services apparently brings along important social benefits for the clients (Littlefield et al., 
2003, Claessens and Feijen, 2006). Suppliers of microfinance are typically Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), cooperatives or specialized microfinance institutions incorporated as 
Shareholder Firms (SHFs). In this article we leave out the cooperatives, and study whether 
NGOs and SHFs differ in bringing along social benefit to their clients. Specifically, is there a 
trade-off between different dimensions of social benefits, and can these tradeoffs predict 
ownership type?  
 
The term ‘social benefit’ is a vague notion. To better define it and to frame the comparison of 
NGOs and SHFs we make use of Schreiner’s (2002) framework for discussion of the social 
benefits of microfinance. Schreiner proposes six aspects of outreach, or social benefits, for 
clients; cost, depth, breadth, length, scope and worth, where Cost is defined as the sum of 
price costs and transaction costs, Depth is defined as clients’ poverty level or other society 
preferences like for instance the percentage of women reached, Breadth is defined as the 
number of clients served, Length is defined as the time frame of the supply of services and 
Scope is defined as number of types of financial contracts supplied. Worth is subjective and 
according to Schreiner the most difficult to define and measure. Thus, it is left out in our 
discussion. The underlying assumption in Schreiner (2002) is that more socially oriented 
Micro Finance Organizations (MFOs), assumed to be the NGOs, can compensate narrow 
breadth, short length and limited scope with greater depth, while less socially oriented MFOs, 
assumed to be the SHFs, can compensate shallow depth with wide breadth, long length and 
ample scope. 
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 We test for the predicted difference between the SHF and the NGO in three ways. First, 
averages of empirical specifications of the five dimensions of social benefits are compared 
and tested for significant difference. Then, the specified dimensions are used to predict the 
organizational type of either NGO or SHF in multivariate logit regressions. Last, we perform 
robustness tests of the results, using adjusted values instead of the original variables. 
 
A self constructed dataset with unusually high-quality information from 132 NGOs and 68 
SHFs in 53 countries is used to carry out the statistical tests. The organizations are united by 
their willingness to open their accounts to careful scrutiny by third party rating agencies and 
to make public their reports. The organizations thus represent the more professionally oriented 
strata of Microfinance Organizations (MFOs). Besides high information reliability, the 
database also provides a unique opportunity to study longitudinal changes in variables, an 
opportunity explored in this article. 
 
Our findings indicate that SHFs and NGOs are more similar than different. Our hypothesis 
that NGOs are not more socially oriented than SHFs is rejected. SHFs’ benefit in scale and 
scope seem not related to ownership type, but to legal constraints impeding NGOs to mobilize 
savings. Our second conclusion is that we cannot find a trade-off among outreach variables. 
Specifically, the return on assets is higher in NGOs. We conclude that ownership type doesn’t 
influence the performance of microfinance organizations. Our conclusion is in line with 
findings in the general banking industry.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section two introduces the transformation 
debate in the microfinance industry. Section three outlines the theory and hypothesises 
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followed by information about the dataset. Section five provides our findings and discussions. 
Section six concludes. 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION DEBATE 
A review of several policy documents and relevant reports reveals that most of them outline 
the strengths of SHFs and the weaknesses of NGOs (Berenbach and Churchill, 1997, C-GAP, 
2003, Chavez and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994, Christen and Rosenberg, 2000, Greuning et al., 
1998, Hardy et al., 2002, Jansson et al., 2004, Staschen, 1999). The implicit message is that a 
SHF will bring along more social benefits than a NGO. This has resulted in a call in the 
industry for NGOs to transform into SHFs (Fernando, 2004, Ledgerwood and White, 2006). 
 
The call for transformation is motivated by the possibility to become regulated institutions 
with a legal right to mobilize local savings and thereby increase both scale and scope of 
operations. Increased ownership control and better access to equity capital are other 
arguments used (White and Campion, 2002, Fernando, 2004, Hishigsuren, 2006, Ledgerwood 
and White, 2006). Yet, so far the call for transformation has stirred up more discussions than 
actions. Of the many thousands NGOs only about 43 have transformed into SHFs 
(Hishigsuren, 2006). This paper aims to bring much needed empirical evidence to the debate. 
How different are actually SHFs and NGOs? 
 
A rival hypothesis may be that SHFs and NGOs do not differ on the social benefits they bring 
along, simply because they need to develop about the same business model in the service of 
customers and in competition with other players in the microfinance market. This is also 
related to the so-called “mission drift” (Woller, 2002, Christen, 2001), which maybe boils 
down to access to capital, the accumulation of knowledge and the crystallization of workable 
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business models. In fact, different ownership forms are common in ordinary banking and 
insurance industries as well (Mayers and Smith, 1983, Hansmann, 1996). In mature bank-
markets where different ownership types coexist, researchers find little evidence to suggest 
that ownership type influences operational efficiency (Altunbas et al., 2001, Crespi et al., 
2004, ESBG, 2004). In a recent paper, Mayers and Smith (2005) did find higher incentive 
problems between owners and managers are more pronounced in mutuals. They propose this 
has an offsetting benefit, in that the bank-customer incentive conflict problems are alleviated. 
May be the success for the microfinance organization is as much dependent upon its relations 
to staff, depositors, borrowers and donors as it is to its owners? 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
According to Hansmann (1996) the difference between a SHF and a NGO lies in who controls 
the organization and who receives the profit from it. In a SHF the shareholders control the 
organization, decide on how to distribute the profits and are free to sell their privileges. A 
NGO might have several stakeholders influencing the organization. Yet, no particular group 
or person can claim ownership of it or receive residual earnings from it.  
 
Most equity holders in SHFs are NGOs, donors or social oriented investors (Ivatury and 
Abrams, 2005, Ivatury and Reille, 2004, Goodman, 2005). Yet, some stakeholders such as 
banking authorities, more debt holders, depositors and some profit minded investors are 
normally unique for SHFs. Also the fact that shareholders are free to sell their shares and that 
several of today’s equity holders have a limited time horizon to their investments should 
indicate that managers of SHFs experience a different type of ownership control than NGOs.    
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Schreiner (2002) assumes that more socially oriented MFOs trade off narrow breadth, short 
length and limited scope with greater depth, while less socially oriented MFOs trade off 
shallow depth with wide breadth, long length and ample scope. Assuming NGOs to be more 
socially oriented than SHFs we derive our main hypothesis:  
 
Main hypothesis 
NGOs are more social oriented than SHFs. That is; NGOs have greater depth, shorter length, 
narrower breadth and more limited scope than SHFs. 
 
In what follows we identify variables able to explain each of the five selected dimensions of 
outreach; costs, depth, length, breadth and scope. We recognize that no single variable or 
simple combination of variables is able to fully explain the completeness of any of the 
dimensions. When available in Schreiner’s article we make us of variables mentioned by him. 
Alongside the identification of the variables we work out specific hypothesis on differences 
between NGOs and SHFs. When not otherwise stated ratio definitions are taken from 
Microrate and IADB (2002). 
 
1) Cost to clients 
Cost to clients is the sum of price costs and transaction costs. Transaction costs like travelling, 
instalment frequency etc. are left out. We concentrate on price costs to the clients becoming 
revenue for the MFO. The revenue ratio including most, but not necessarily all, price costs to 
clients is the income yield. In a MFO the income yield is a function of debt costs, operational 
costs, loan loss costs and equity costs.  
 
a) Debt costs 
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Ignoring inflation debt costs are mainly a function of credit risk (institutional and contextual) 
and legal constraints related to the intermediation of deposits. We estimate that the 
debt/equity ratio is generally higher in SHFs than in NGOs. The main explanatory factor is 
that as opposed to NGOs most SHFs are regulated and can legally intermediate publics’ 
deposits. In addition, also credit risk, whether perceived or real, plays a role as most lenders, 
all else equal, allow higher loans to SHFs than to NGOs.  
       
Hypothesis 1 a) 
Debt costs are higher in NGOs than in SHFs.  
 
We use the cost of funds ratio as a measure together with the debt/equity ratio. However, 
since some firms have negative ratios due to negative equity, we also include the debt/assets 
measure.  
 
b) Operational costs 
Operational costs depend among others factors on market (e.g. population density and 
competition), operational scale, staff costs, methodology (e.g. group versus individual 
lending), credit size, loan defaults, product scope, technology and management whereof the 
later can significantly influence most of the others. Christen (1999) suggests the main 
‘efficiency drivers’ are average wage paid to staff, average balance per loan and the number 
of clients per staff member (Christen, 1999). Implicit in most ownership literature is that 
owners with pecuniary incentives are more able to induce efficient operations. 
 
Hypothesis 1 b) 
Operational costs are higher in NGOs than in SHFs. 
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 We employ the operating expense ratio as a measure   
 
c) Loan losses 
Loan losses depend among other factors on market (e.g. competition and segment served), 
methodology, technology and management whereof the later can significantly influence most 
of the others. Less ownership control indicates that NGOs lack some incentives to follow up 
defaulters. At the same time NGOs, due to their social mission, are more inclined to accept 
clients’ excuses. Yet, for profit motivated organizations, there might be a trade-off between 
increased loan losses and reduced operational costs. Nevertheless the following hypothesis 
should hold: 
 
Hypothesis 1 c) 
Loan losses are higher in NGOs than in SHFs. 
 
In accounting reports loan losses can be found as write offs and portfolio at risk and it is the 
combination of the two which ultimately tells us something of the loan losses.  
 
d) Equity costs 
Equity costs are influenced by managers’ interest in securing their own future and reputation, 
but also depend on the owners’ pecuniary incentives. All else constant, equity costs should be 
higher in SHFs than in NGOs.  
 
Hypothesis 1 d) 
Equity cost measured as return on equity (ROE) is higher in SHFs than in NGOs. 
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 2) Depth of outreach 
Depth is defined as clients’ poverty level or other society preferences like for instance the 
percentage of women reached. Reaching poorer clients is relatively more costly since the cost 
of operating a small loan is often quite similar to that of operating bigger loans. More socially 
oriented organizations should be more willing to reach poorer and more discriminated clients.  
 
Hypothesis 2 a) 
NGOs reach poorer clients than SHFs 
 
A much used proxy for measuring poverty level among clients is average loan size per client.  
 
Hypothesis 2 b) 
NGOs reach relatively more women than SHFs. 
 
c) Breadth of outreach 
Breadth of outreach is the number of clients served. Clients can be both savings clients and 
credit clients. Since NGOs in most cases cannot mobilize deposits due to legal constraint, 
their number of savings clients should in most cases be zero. Excluded from the opportunity 
to fund loans with savings together with the proposed difficulty in accessing debts indicate 
that also the number of credit clients should be lower in NGOs than in the SHFs.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
SHFs reach out to more clients than NGOs. 
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We measure this by the total number of clients and the total number of credit clients. 
 
d) Length of outreach 
Length of outreach is the time frame of the supply of microfinance. Length is difficult to 
measure, but profit is a proxy because it signals the ability to sustain the business over time. 
Since SHFs should have the benefit of lower costs, higher scale, broader scope and increased 
ownership control they should be able to sustain longer than NGOs. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
SHFs are more profitable than NGOs. 
 
Due to considerable variation in debt/equity ratios profit in the microfinance industry is best 
measured as the return on assets (ROA). 
 
e) Scope of outreach 
Scope of outreach is the number of types of financial contracts supplied. Scope depends on 
market opportunities (demand, competition etc.), available resources, management and legal 
constraints whereof the later is a major market distorter. Since the mobilization of deposits is 
generally reserved for regulated entities NGOs should, due to their difficulties in becoming 
regulated, generally be supplying fewer financial contracts than their peers. When it comes to 
the number of credit products being supplied the NGOs are also disadvantaged due to the lack 
of scale and resources. 
 
Hypothesis 5 a) 
SHFs offer voluntary savings while NGOs generally don’t.  
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 We simply use the sum of total savings in the two ownership types. 
 
Hypothesis 5 b) 
The number of credit products offered is higher in SHFs than in NGOs. 
 
In summary, the Schreiner (2002) model implies a trade-off between the depth, that is, the 
outreach to poor clients in particular, and other dimensions of outreach, such as scale. The 
hypothesis is that the NGO trades off higher depth with lower breadth, length, scope and 
higher costs to the clients compared to the SHF. We investigate this by simply comparing 
averages of specifications of the five outreach dimensions in table 1 for the subgroups of SHF 
and NGO.  
 
Furthermore, if the SHF and NGO differ in dimensions of outreach, we should be able to 
predict organizational type from these outreach dimensions. In particular, depth should be an 
important prediction variable. We study this in a simple logit model where the dummy 
variable “ownership type” is the binary dependent variable containing the SHF and the NGO 
types.  
 
Definitions of variables used in the analysis are given in table 1  
Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definitions (when available from (Microrate and IADB, 2002) 
Cost  
A Debt cost 
Cost of Funds Ratio The cost of funds at the end of a given period, that is COF = (Interests and 
fee expense on funding liabilities)/(Average funding liabilities) 
Debt/equity ratio The ratio of debt to equity at the end of a given period  
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Debt/Assets The ratio of debt to total assets 
 
B Operational cost 
Operating expense ratio: The ratio of the operating expenses to the average loan portfolio, thus 
OEP = (Operating expenses)/(Average total loan portfolio) 
C Loan losses 
Write-Off ratio The ratio of loans that has been written off and accepted as a loss, that is WOR = 
(value of loans written-off)/(average loan portfolio) 
Portfolio at Risk (PaR 30) The percentage of the total loan portfolio with more than 30 days in 
arrears 
D Equity costs Return on Equity (ROE) 
Depth 
Average loan amount The average outstanding loan amount per loan client at the end of a given 
year, thus, ALA = (Gross outstanding portfolio)/(Number of active credit clients) 
Conscious gender bias? Does the MFI report having a conscious gender bias? 1 being yes 
Women percentage  The percentage of the clients being female or percentage of the portfolio held 
by women 
Breadth 
Total number of clients The total number of clients that are active with the MFI  
Number of credit clients The number of credit clients at the end of the period 
Length Return on Assets The return on assets (ROA) at the end of a given period. 
Scope 
Total voluntary savings The clients’ total voluntary savings with the MFI as appeared in the 
balance sheet at the end of a given period and includes demand and fixed deposits  
Loan products The number of loan products offered by the MFI 
 
 
DATASET 
The dataset consisting of 132 NGOs and 68 SHFs in 53 countries has been constructed using 
rating reports made public at the www.ratingfund.org. The dataset focuses on risk assessment 
reports made by five rating agencies: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-
Cril. The methodologies applied by the rating agencies have been compared and no major 
differences in how they assess MFOs have been found. All the five agencies are approved 
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official rating agencies by the Rating Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-
GAP) (www.ratingfund.org). 
 
Transparency in microfinance has been emphasized as increasingly important. No commonly 
accepted international standards for microfinance existed until some years back, when the 
rating agency MicroRate invited the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and two of the other rating agencies M-Cril and Planet Rating to agree 
on a set of commonly used indicators. This resulted in a document published by IADB and 
Microrate called Performance Indicators for Microfinance Institutions. When comparing the 
ratio-definitions applied by the agencies it’s observed that all five rating agencies adopt the 
common standards. 
 
Different organizations sometimes tend to have different ways of presenting their financial 
figures. Hence, the rating agencies present some adjusted variables to allow a better 
comparison with other organizations. The main adjustments are normally adjustments 
considering interest on delinquent loans, elimination of subsidies, standard calculation of 
provisions, adjustments for inflation, and adjustments for write-offs on loans. In our statistical 
tests we make use of unadjusted variables before we include adjusted variables in robustness 
checks. 
 
The rating reports making up the database are from year 2000 to year 2006 with the vast 
majority being from the last three years. In the cases where several rating reports are available 
from the same organization the most recent report (as of different dates during 2006) has been 
selected.  
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 The rating reports contain financial information for up to four years. The actual year the rating 
took place is reported year 0, while the previous years are reported year – 1, year -2 and year -
3.  
 
When needed all numbers in the dataset have been annualized and dollarized using official 
exchange rates at the given time. 
  
Of the 68 SHFs in the database 13 are banks and 55 are non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs). The difference between banks and NBFIs normally becomes apparent in the capital 
requirements and permitted scope of operations. Both banks and NBFIs are usually, but not 
always, regulated by local banking authorities.  
 
The rating agencies differ in their emphasis and abundance of available information. Thus, 
different N on different variables and in different years is reported. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Tradeoffs in outreach? 
 
With the specifications suggested in table 1, tables 2 and 3 show the averages on the five 
dimensions, while an ANOVA F test gives the significance level of the difference between the 
two group means. In each year, the extreme values for the debt/equity ratio have been filtered 
out, that is, cases with values above 20 and below zero are removed. The SHF is defined to be 
the banks and the non-bank financial institutions. Note that the dataset only contains data 
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from year 0 on Conscious gender bias, the Women percentage and Loan products. Thus, these 
are only reported in year 0. 
 
Tables 2 and 3  
 
We comment on all years together. The depth variables are the Average loan amount, the 
Conscious gender bias, and the Women percentage. Thus, if the depth is higher in NGOs, we 
would expect to find lower Average loan amount and higher values on the gender variables. 
We do find a significant difference in the conscious gender bias variable, but when it comes to 
average loan amount and Women percentage, the expressed bias does not show up in actual 
practice. Note that N differs considerably between these two variables. The fraction of loans 
given to women is perhaps surprisingly high in SHFs, about two thirds. Thus, the depth 
hypothesis is not supported. 
 
Do we find the tradeoffs with other dimensions? We find significant differences in Debt cost. 
The debt/equity ratio is significantly higher in the SHF than in the NGO in all years. 
Likewise, the scope is lower in NGOs. We find significant differences in Voluntary savings 
and Loan products. The differences are as predicted in Schreiner (2002). For the breadth 
dimension we find significant differences for all clients, but for credit clients only for the 
years -2 and -3. Probably, we need to consider the debt cost, breadth and scope together. 
Since NGOs are normally not regulated, they cannot accept deposits. This institutional aspect 
may explain the significant differences on the variables. With lower deposits, the NGOs will 
have a smaller capital base to fund lending. Then we will expect both the debt/equity ratio and 
the voluntary savings to be lower in NGOs. 
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On the other hand, we find some interesting similarities. For instance, the Operating expense 
ratio is not significantly different in any year, and the ratio is in fact lower in SHFs only for 
the two recent years. Thus, we cannot say that SHFs are run in a more cost-effective manner 
than NGOs. A second similarity concerns the equity costs, specified as ROE. This shows no 
significant difference in any year, and is lower in year -3 in the SHF. Furthermore, the length 
dimension, specified as ROA, is consistently higher in the NGO than in the SHF. But again, 
the differences are too small to be significant. However, the hypothesis was the reverse of 
what we find. Thus, the NGO does not sacrifice business opportunities in order to supply 
credit to poor clients. Perhaps, as a supplier with fewer products to offer, it earns 
specialization advantages. Perhaps also, the question should be turned around: Why does the 
NGO perform as well as the SHF on traditional financial measures? 
 
Do these differences together confirm the Schreiner (2002) trade-off hypothesis? They do not. 
The significant differences seem to better conform to the way the SHF and the NGO are 
regulated, specifically, that since most NGOs are not regulated by banking authorities, they 
cannot offer services to depositors. Then, if our hypothesis derived from Schreiner’s 
framework were correct we would expect to see significant differences especially for depth.  
Yet, we find such a difference only for the intention of serving women, but this did not 
transform into a higher female share of loans or smaller loans from the NGO. Otherwise, the 
similarities between the two ownership groups indicate that both have found a sustainable 
business model for the microfinance market. Based on our simple comparison of averages of 
the outreach dimensions we reject our main hypothesis: NGOs are not more social oriented 
than SHFs. 
 
Predicting ownership type 
 17
 In this section, we test our hypothesis by considering dimensions simultaneously in logit 
regressions. While the comparisons of means are a partial analysis, the effects may show up 
more explicitly when all dimensions are considered together.  
 
In table 5 we report results from logit regressions when the banks and NBFI together 
constitute the SHF. The SHF and the NGO constitute the binary dependent variable 
ownership type. Since SHF is coded 0 and the NGO 1, a positive sign indicates a higher 
probability for detecting the NGO, a negative sign will pick out the SHF. Thus, from our 
hypothesis derived from Schreiner’s framework, we would expect the depth to show a 
positive relationship to ownership type, while the other dimensions should show negative 
signs. Specifically, the ROA should be negative.  
 
For the regressions, we have included only those variables that are continuous. These 
correspond to the variables for which we have observations for each year. Furthermore, for 
each dimension we have restricted the inclusion of variables to only one, except for the cost 
dimension, where from table 1 we have several sub-groups. In these regressions, no control 
variables are included. Later, we perform robustness test in order to check the results. Table 4 
now gives estimates for ownership type when debt cost is gauged as the debt level. 
 
Table 4 
 
The omnibus  test is a Wald test for the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the 
equation are zero. We can reject this hypothesis in all specifications. The Nagelkerke 
)8(2χ
2R  
measure shows how much is explained. This overall measure gives values that are usually 
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much smaller than those in linear regression models. Therefore, the statistic shows 
satisfactory results. Also, the percentage of cases correctly classified indicates that the overall 
regression performs well. 
 
Table 4 shows that our measure of depth, average loan amount, is not significant in any 
regressions. Overall, few significant results are obtained, indicating that it is difficult to pick 
out the type of ownership from the Schneider (2002) dimensions. The negative debt level 
(year -3) and the positive operating portfolio expense ratio (years 0 to -2) have the correct 
signs according to our hypothesis. So do the results for PaR30. But the ROA (length 
dimension) is positive and significant in year -1, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Thus, 
although costs and risk are higher in the NGO, this type of organization has developed a 
business model that has a ROA on par or better than the SHF. This indicates that the NGO 
should be sustainable in the long term, contrary to our hypothesis derived from Schneider’s 
framework.  
 
Are our results upset when other specifications are used? We run robustness tests when the 
debt/equity ratio is used instead of the debt level, see table 5, and tests when ROE and ROA 
are removed in table 6. In the table 5 regressions, the extreme values of the debt/equity ratio 
are filtered out, that is, cases with negative values and ratios higher than 20 are removed. 
 
Table 5 
 
The results from table 5 parallel those in table 4 to a large extent, although we obtain fewer 
significant coefficients. Operating portfolio expense ratio, which turned out to be important in 
table 4, is very close to significance in years -1 and -2. Again, the depth variable average loan 
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amount is nowhere significant, and while the cost dimension variables debt/equity ratio and 
operating portfolio expense ratio are as predicted, the length variable ROA is positive and 
does not support the hypothesis. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the coefficient 
values are at about the same size level in both tables. This indicates that our results are rather 
robust. 
 
We also performed tests of the relation with ROE and ROA alternatively removed in year 0. 
The reason is that these variables may be highly correlated. However, the tests in table 6 show 
that coefficients are little perturbed, indicating that our results are robust. 
 
Table 6 
 
Last, we have performed several tests that are not reported. Instead of ROE and ROA, we 
used the adjusted values. Instead of the average loan amount, we adjusted the figure by GDP 
per capita. Instead of the debt level we used the cost of funds. None of these tests upset the 
results already found in tables 4 and 5. The reason for not using adjusted variables in the first 
place is the loss of observations. This is important, since the number of observations is 
already low, statistically speaking. The same is the case for control variables. But with the 
satisfactory robustness results, we think that these shortcomings are of minor importance. 
 
Taken together, the Schneider (2002) dimensions are not successful in differentiating between 
ownership types. Our main hypothesis is rejected. NGOs are not more socially oriented than 
SHFs. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
We have studied whether ownership type influence the social benefits of microfinance. Our 
overall conclusion is that it does not. We have tested the hypothesis that greater depth in the 
NGO is traded off against higher operating, debt and equity costs, together with lower length, 
that is, a shorter life span. We could not support the hypothesis in partial tests of equality of 
means in sub-groups of NGOs and SHFs, or in multivariate logit regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the ownership type containing the NGO and the SHF. In the partial 
analysis, the differentiating variables are associated with the access to deposits, which many 
NGOs are denied, and in the logit regressions, the depth variable is nowhere significant, and 
significant variables are contradictory relative to the hypothesis. The overall conclusion is that 
our hypothesis is rejected. NGOs are not more socially oriented than SHFs. 
 
Instead, we believe that the NGOs have found a business model that is viable and that gives 
the NGO sustainability. The reason for our optimism is that the ROA is on par, or better, than 
alternative ownership types, such as banks and non-bank financial institutions. Our results are 
in line with conclusions in a recent World Bank paper by Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Murdoch 
(2006). 
 
In mature banking markets ownership does not influence performance (Altunbas et al., 2001, 
Crespi et al., 2004). Our findings demonstrate that neither in the microfinance industry it 
does. So why does policy makers and consultants impose costly transformation processes on 
NGOs when they are already similar to SHFs? Would it not be better to adapt legal 
frameworks to allow the best performing NGOs to mobilize savings and thereby also compete 
with SHFs in scope and scale?  
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Table 2: The average and standard deviation of aspects of the five dimensions of outreach in 
shareholder owned firms (SHF) and non-governmental organizations (NGO), years 0 and -1 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year 0 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
Debt/Equity ratio 3,646 3,978 64 2,137 2,725 115 0,003 
Debt level 0,512 0,319 67 0,587 0,283 131 0,096 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,267 0,220 67 0,295 0,184 130 0,341 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,082 0,059 57 0,081 0,087 120 0,951 
Write-Off ratio 0,013 0,017 47 0,020 0,043 98 0,318 
PaR 30 0,057 0,072 68 0,052 0,073 130 0,643 
ROE 0,119 0,235 50 0,070 0,389 109 0,407 
Average loan amount 701,230 657,560 67 562,292 699,577 130 0,179 
Conscious gender bias? 0,296 0,461 54 0,452 0,500 115 0,054 
Women percentage 0,677 0,300 19 0,758 0,237 55 0,235 
Clients 40900 98703 60 17352 24891 131 0,011 
Credit clients 25666 52383 66 16839 24775 131 0,110 
ROA 0,026 0,088 65 0,040 0,094 129 0,313 
Voluntary savings 5058490 17479664 65 26892 150334 123 0,002 
Loan products 5,138 4,391 65 3,492 2,234 128 0,001 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -1 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
Debt/Equity ratio 3,294 3,150 54 1,673 1,700 107 0,000 
Debt level 0,526 0,308 56 0,549 0,298 121 0,648 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,285 0,234 54 0,320 0,206 114 0,326 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,080 0,061 47 0,082 0,111 100 0,936 
Write-Off ratio 0,025 0,039 47 0,024 0,035 104 0,875 
PaR 30 0,064 0,080 53 0,061 0,086 112 0,827 
ROE 0,045 0,261 50 0,004 0,495 109 0,583 
Average loan amount 680,869 627,311 53 626,179 886,786 112 0,687 
Clients 27449 72211 46 12350 16945 118 0,034 
Credit clients 20450 49582 52 12200 16908 118 0,109 
ROA 0,003 0,121 52 0,032 0,115 114 0,141 
Voluntary savings 2969318 8435670 55 12893 84654 115 0,000 
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Table 3: The average and standard deviation of aspects of the five dimensions of outreach in 
shareholder owned firms (SHF) and non-governmental organizations (NGO), years -2 and -3 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -2 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
DE 2,985 2,938 52 1,583 1,894 104 0,000 
Debt level 0,485 0,339 54 0,516 0,316 113 0,556 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,305 0,280 51 0,334 0,238 104 0,495 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,076 0,052 46 0,075 0,091 92 0,954 
Write-Off ratio 0,021 0,036 49 0,028 0,047 103 0,410 
PaR 30 0,064 0,089 52 0,071 0,097 109 0,633 
ROE 0,022 0,288 50 -0,086 1,282 107 0,556 
Average loan amount 709,543 633,130 39 822,469 1446,844 73 0,644 
Clients 26575 70398 46 9744 13955 116 0,015 
Credit clients 17605 41548 51 9662 13854 116 0,067 
ROA 0,000 0,106 53 0,012 0,157 111 0,604 
Voluntary savings 2052636 5150219 53 7568 53001 110 0,000 
 SHF NGO F-test 
Year -3 Mean Std N Mean Std N Sign 
DE 3,031 3,164 37 1,616 2,284 72 0,009 
Debt level 0,517 0,367 40 0,465 0,302 77 0,418 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  0,495 0,658 33 0,410 0,350 64 0,406 
Cost of Funds Ratio 0,092 0,077 32 0,078 0,066 52 0,371 
Write-Off ratio 0,015 0,021 31 0,024 0,041 73 0,263 
PaR 30 0,070 0,085 38 0,075 0,102 74 0,777 
ROE -0,101 0,688 38 0,074 0,580 72 0,160 
Average loan amount 680,869 627,311 53 626,179 886,786 112 0,687 
Clients 21495 55388 32 7073 10542 80 0,027 
Credit clients 15148 34393 37 7192 10513 78 0,063 
ROA -0,016 0,180 40 -0,002 0,165 75 0,689 
Voluntary savings 1666170 3607646 42 6679 44028 94 0,000 
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Table 4: Logit calculations of organizational predictions. Years 0 to -3 when 
the binary variable ownership type contain banks and non-bank financial 
institutions (SHF), coded as 0, and NGO, coded as 1 
 Year 
 0 -1 -2 -3 
Debt level -0.612 -0.949 -1.482 -2.128* 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.769** 2.407* 1.868* 2.615 
PaR 30  6.793 7.935* 5.217 7.745* 
ROE -0.344 -0.455 -0.232 0.964 
Average loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 3.753 6.695* 2.912 0.954 
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.260 0.246 0.996 1.201 
Observations 148 144 136 91 
Classified correctly (%) 79.1 79.2 79.4 79.1 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.399 0.377 0.369 0.449 
 
 
Table 5: Logit calculations of ownership type. Years 0 to -3 when the 
binary dependent variable ownership type contains banks and non-bank 
financial institutions (SHF), coded as 0, and NGO, coded as 1. Debt/equity 
ratio is used instead of debt level 
 0 -1 -2 -3
DE -0.097 -0.168* -0.056 -0.021 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.576** 2.225 1.899 1.093 
PaR 6.642 7.815* 4.215 10.725 
ROE -0.368 -1.149 -0.265 1.244 
Average loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ROA 3.319 7.978** 2.748 0.092 
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.323 0.159 0.416 0.036 
Observations 145 142 134 82 
Classified correctly 79.3 80.0 69.4 78.0 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.402 0.393 0.351 0.430 
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Table 6: Robustness logit calculations of organizational 
predictions, varying ROE and ROA Year 0.  
Dependent All ROE ROA 
Bank-Nf-NGO variables removed removed 
Debt level -0.612 0.311 -0.854 
Operating portfolio expense ratio  3.769** 2.264* 3.753** 
Portfolio at Risk (PaR 30),  6.793 8.193* 6.303 
ROE -0.344  0.097 
Average outstanding loan amount  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Credit clients  0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
ROA 3.753 5.161**  
Total voluntary savings  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Constant -0.260 -0.495 0.062 
Observations 148 179 149 
Classified correctly 79.1 74.8 78.5 
Omnibus Chi-sq (8) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.399 0.354 0.405 
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